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1The following is an analysis of American government. Specifically it 
is a treatise on the relationship between the Supreme Court of the United 
States and the States which make up the United States of America. It is 
my contention that there is an improper, perhaps even treacherous, 
imbalance in this one of many institutional relationships which make up 
the American constitution. Treacherous, in that it undermines the 
integrity of our written Constitution and the very concept of 
constitutionalism through a written constitution. Treacherous, in that 
under the present arrangements the courts assume sovereign prerogatives 
that should be resex'ved to the people. Treacherous, in that it stagnates 
the nation by insisting on a uniformity that is destructive of 
federalism. This relationship is depriving the nation of the diversity 
which is essential to a living and progressive constitution. And 
treacherous, in that this relationship is antithetical of the very theses 
on which this nation has been built—  responsive government with 
self-government as its end.
This paper elaborates on the history and nature of the relationship 
between the Supreme Court and the Btates, and from there it will make 
some suggestions concerning a remedy to this current flaw in our 
constitution. It is therefore a treatise on political constitution, not 
on state government or jurisprudence, though these and other topics will 
figure greatly in the discussion. But before I proceed to the main 
thesis, let me finish prefacing my remarks by framing the discussion in 
terms germaine to a study of political constitution and declaring the 
standard of good government under which I have labored.
In the United States these days the typical attitude toward the role 
of government or any government instituion is that the end justifies the
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authority based on its willingness to support our political ends. In 
other words, when a particular cause is unable to acheive its ends 
through proper Constitutional channels, it seeks extra-legal remedies. 
This is the very essence of anarchy. These efforts pretend to 
legitimacy, as officials and official institutions are the perpetrators. 
We have long been aware of the pemiciousness of this sophistry. John 
Adams declared that ours was a government where laws were supreme not 
men.il] Official misconduct is probably the worst form of illegal 
activity. In the American tradition, such a breach of faith is 
considered an abandonment of office and authoriy. "He (King George III) 
has abdicated government by declaring us out of his protection and waging 
war against us," stated the Declaration of Independence. Hence, what we 
seek here is not the supremacy of the institution most willing to enforce 
our current political desires, but the constitution of a government most 
able to secure our rights, through law, in the long run.
In this light, I hope to free this discussion of the shackles of 
tangential issues. This is not a discussion of the wisdom of any 
particular piece of legislation. Whenever states' rights is mentioned, 
images of the Southern states oppressing minorities are conjured up. In 
my mind, there is no question that the government should protect people 
from racial prejudice and oppression. I am not suggesting that any 
political right is a greater end than the unalienable rights of 
individuals, but that a government ordered on certain principles is 
better able to secure these rights.
There are four additional myths or prejudices which must be dispensed 
with here. First there is a false idea prevalent that it is somehow 
unpatriotic to oppose any measure that centralises American government. 
Any measure that promotes looal sovereignty is viewed with the same
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jaundiced eye that condemns secession from the Union. Walter Dean 
Burnham writes in one instance, "It is not difficult to discern the 
thrust of these proposed changes. They were designed to break up the 
insistent drift toward nationalization and democratization in our 
political life...." (As if nationalization meant democratization.) He 
continues concerning these efforts to reverse Baker v. Carr, "Overturning 
Cohens v. Virginia <1821> and the verdict of Appomattox, it would finally 
demonstrate that after all the Founders had not created a nation."!2]
The national government is indisputably best able to respond to our 
interest in national security. And in times of crisis, national security 
probably outweighs all of the legitimate interests of any state, 
institution, or citizen. But it is absurd to suggest that any degree of 
local autonomy is some how sedition.
Similarly there is a common assumption that the Supreme Court should 
not be held in check, lest we undermine Judicial independence, hinder the 
work of protecting our rights, and ignore the sanctity of law. Let us 
deal more objectively with the role of the Court in our government. The 
Supreme Court is not the pristine institution, innocent of political 
motives, that it presents itself as. Nor is it necessarily the Great 
Defender of our liberties! we shall see that it is the Constitution and 
the constitution of our people which are the guarantors of such. 
Furthermore, the Court is not designed to be in the business of making 
laws. It is presumably subject to the "law of the land" (the 
constitution, Acts of Congress, and treaties of the United States of 
America,) as it adjudicates specific cases. And while its decisions make 
for Judicial precedent, such precedent is inferior to law.
Just as there is no reason to view the Supreme Court with religious 
reverence, political analysis is not served by stereotypioally portraying
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the states as enclaves of medieval feudalism resisting the enlightened 
liberation sought by the national government. (Burnham calls it 
Mrurally-dominated, rotten-boroughism.H [ 3 ]) The historical evidence 
which follows will show that states and their predecessors are as
inclined to progressive or populist initiatives and conventions as the 
national government or any Institution thereof. In fact we shall see 
that almost every cause for progress in human rights or toward better 
government in this nation has had its birth at the grassroots of American 
government.
When the Constitution was adopted almost all of its provisions had
some precedent in the constitutions and charters of the states. B'very
state had provided for a seperation of powers, trial by jury, election of
a representative legislature, and some religious freedom. While it is
true that each of the colonies had been greatly influenced by their
English heritage, the significant point here is that they had adopted
these measures independent of outside coercion.
The national Bill of Rights, which is now being force fed to the
states, contains no novelties. One or more of the States had already
provided for due process, protection against double jeopardy and
self-incrimination, protection against quartering troops during peace
time, the right to bear arms, freedom of the press, and freedom of
speech. Here some passages from the early Declaration of Rights of the
Commonwealth of Virginia are replete with these fundamental American
themes. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, 12 June 1776:[4]
1.That all men are <by nature> created equally free and Independent, 
and have certain inherent rights,•• .<namely,> the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and 
e pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
3.That Government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common 
benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation or 
community i*.» whenever any Government shall be found inadequate or 
contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an
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to reform, alter, or abolish it...
8. That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to 
demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted by 
witnesses to call for evidence in his favour, and to a speedy trial 
by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent 
he cannot be found guilty, nor can he be compelled to give evidence 
againBt himself; that no man be deprived of his liberty except by law 
of the land, or the judgement of his peers.
9. Excessive bail ought not to be required, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted*
10. That <general> warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places <without evidence of a fact 
commited,> or to seize any person or persons <not named, or whose 
offense is> not particularly described <and supported by evidences 
are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.
15. That Religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging it can be directed only by reason and 
conviction, not by force or violence.
While these profound thoughts are familiar to us, the full 
enumeration of rights found in this document is even more sophisticated 
than that of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution* And 
Virginia carved these ideas into stone fifteen years before they were 
incorporated into the Constitution. Massachussetts, in the North, went 
on to adopt an almost identical set of articles into its constitution of 
1780.[5] (To enumerate them would be redundant.) One further note, a 
fortnight after Virginia adopted the Declaration of Rights, it formed a 
constitution based upon these same principles and gave voice to Thomas 
Jefferson's litany of complaints against the Crown of England in that 
document, several days before the Continental Congress approved them.[6] 
The issue over which the states are most notorious is slavery. From 
today's vantage point it is difficult to comprehend the complexities of 
the rise and fall of slavery in America. But understanding the origins 
and history of slavery in America will help us understand that it is an 
issue that transcends any political institution* When independence was 
declared every colony had slaves in it. When the Constitution* wee
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adopted, it recognized slavery as an Institution.[7] And when Dred Scott 
v. Sanford came before the Supreme Court in 18S7, Chief Justice Taney 
declared that Negroes were outside the compact formed in 1787 (the 
Constitution.) And he went on to say that for Congress to forbid the 
transportation of slaves into the Territories was to deprive citizens of 
their property without due process.[8] It was the Northern states which 
first forsook the practice of slavery. In the year 1780, Pennsylvania 
and Massachusetts emancipated their slaves. And eight years later, 
Connecticut and Rhode Island joined them as Free states.[9] The trend 
continued in the North, and these states were not influenced or assisted 
by any branch of the national government. In fact, their commitment to 
the Constitution required the Northern states to respect the property of 
the slave-holders traveling in the North, including their slaves. The 
Taney Court upheld these principles in its Dred Scot„ decision.[10]
Slavery instead of declining in the South, as had probably been hoped at 
the convention of 1787, became the backbone of the cotton industry. And 
cotton had become king of the South in the fifty years which followed the 
Revolutionary war. So in the final years of the 18th century, the North 
and South took divergent paths on this volatile social issue, mainly for 
economic reasons.[11]
In 1860 the great unresolved issue of 1787 tore the American nation 
assunder. The important theme here is the manner in which change was 
wrought. Ve witness that local institutions are capable of progressive 
change and even served as the testing ground for such change and th> he 
nation was reconstituted through traditional American channels—  warfare 
and amendments to the Constitution. And when the Thirteenth Amendment; 
was ratified, it not only affected state laws, but repealed the current 
Supreme Court doctrine on the subject.
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women's sufferage is another progressive development in this nation 
on which the local governments have had a significant, positive, and 
in1 cresting impact. It '-as not the Congress nor the Court across the 
street which first afforded women the right to vote. This movement did 
not receive its firs" victories anywhere on the Eastern Seaboard or 
within i SCO miles of Washington, but in thf hinterlands of the 
Territories of Wyoming and Utah. In it 79 the Territory of Wyoming passed 
a hill granting women the right to vote, and Utah followed a few months 
later.[32] Wyoming and Utah, not even possessing the sovereignty of 
states, wore fifty years ahead of the national government, which did not 
propose the Nineteenth Amendment urril idl >. And in doing so these 
f1 'defling societies had defied national sentiment. There had been a 
great deal of pressure on the government of Wyoming after it initiated 
sufferage for women and other feminist reforms.[13]
But the national government of the United States reached an all-time 
low in centralized tyranny in its dealings with Utah. In 1687 Congress 
passed the Edmunds-Tucker Act, outlawing polygamy in the Territories. It 
must be remembered that the Northeastern plutocrats did not limit their 
self-righteousness to slavery. Abraham Lincoln ran on a platform calling 
for the end of the "twin barbarisms of slavery and polygamy."l14]
Polygamy was somewhat prevelant in Utaht15], where it was a religious 
duty of the Mormons (members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints,) who had settled the territory. The ruling majority in 
Washington proved their insincerity even quicker here than in the case of 
slavery. The Edmunds-Tucker Act which was passed under the pretense of 
liberating Utah's women, contained a clause which revoked their 
sufferage. The Supreme Court upheld the act in Reynolds v. United 
States.(16] And once again Congress set up a carpetbag government.
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Almost any cause in the history of this nation which has promoted 
human rights or bettor government has been initiated in the state 
arenas. Individual states have been the launching ground for the labor 
movement, both the traditional one and the the fight for the rights of 
migrant workers. Volumes could be written on the advances in education 
which rave token place in the states. The programs of Franklin Roosevelt 
wore- first implemented in the State of New York, while he was governor.
7! • list goes on: sunset laws, popular referenda and recall, innovations
in budgeting, the popular election of Presidential electors, the death 
penalty as cruel and unusual punishment, and etc.
In the last analysis representative institutions have great potential 
for eood government, whatever the scope of their representation. But an 
institution with 532 representatives from anywhere from Hawaii to Maine 
and three representatives from Wyoming can hardly be responsive to the 
local problems of Wyoming. We see this in the Congress' dealings with 
the post-Bellum South and the Territories.t17] The states have provided 
for the governmental needs of their citizens for two to three centuries. 
They hardly need the Supreme Court to review all of their actions at this 
stage of the game.
There is one final prejudice I would like to discuss here. That is 
that the states are archaic institutions no longer representative of 
meaningful divisions. Or put another way sometimes, this natic i is too 
homogenous now; we have most interests in common. Television satellites, 
and air travel have supposedly made this nation much more of a single 
community.
In a sense this is of course true. But I would maintain that the 
nation is actually much more diverse now than it. has ever been. While 
technology has brought us together, it has also contributed to the
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increased diversity of the nation. There exists in this country the 
traditional interests of cotton, tobacco, wheat, mercantilism, retailers, 
textiles, shoes, and other manufacturing; but now we also have soybeans, 
robotics, computers, telocomunications, steel, plastics, petroleum, and 
etc. Plus as can be seen from that list *he relationships among cur 
various economic interests is even more complex today.
Which brings us to the point that the stateB are not perfect 
representations of various interests. I readily admit this. If they 
were, there would perhaps be no need for federalism. But as there is a 
peculiar complexity of interests in any one of the states, they need to 
be independent in designing their own constitutions, btate jurisdiction 
also allows for local jurisdiction and provides a means for representing 
regional interests in national government. Furthermore the states do 
represent very different economic, social, religious, and ethnic 
cultures, at least s much as they did at the time of the revolution. 
Mississippi is 35% Black, while only .2% of of Montana's population is 
Black. New Mexico is a little more than 38% of Spanish origin; the same 
figure for Maine is .4%.[16] Rhode Island and New Jersery have a heavy 
concentration of White ethnics. The State of Utah is more than 7CU 
Mormon, and, with the exception of Idaho, there is not another state in 
the Union with more than 10% of its population espousing this faith.[19]
A majority of the people of both Rhode Island and Massachusetts are Roman 
Catholic.[20] Hawaii is the only state with a large concentration of 
Bhudist; and New York is 12% Jewish compared to the northern Mountain 
states with only .1% each.[21] Obviously North Carolina does not have 
the population of Eskimos and Aleutians that Alaska does. Nor are 
Alaskans much concerned about tobacco subsidies. California's economy is 
dominated by high tech, entertainment, and produce, very different
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concerns from those of Maine's fishermen. And the blue-collar workers of 
Michigan, OUo, and and Pennsylvania are not nearly as concerned about 
Medicare as the citizens of Florida. The need for local administration 
of local problems and for the representation of local interests at the 
national level is as real today as it has ever been. And while the 
states are not perfect political divisions, they are as close as they 
have over been and the only thing we have.
Let us now look at the standards by which I will evaluate the 
Constitution of the United States and comment on how our government 
should be constituted. I like to think that, like Abraham Lincoln, I 
have no political sentiment which does not derive from the Declaration of 
Independence. Thomas Jefferson makes three claims in the Declaration to 
which I would like to recur throughout this paper. The first of these 
is, ’That to secure (certain inalienable] Rights, Governments are 
instituted among men,...." Second, "That whenever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter 
or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation 
on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them 
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." And 
thirdly, the document goes on to say, "Pruvunce, indeed, will dictate 
that Governments long established should not be changed for light and 
transient causes."
The Declaration of Independence rejected the rule of the British King 
in Pariiment because it had become destructive of the proper ends of 
government. But the document said nothing about what form of government 
was best, neither in general nor for the Americana specifically, it had 
defined the first duty as belonging to the particular people to be 
governed. And as for the American government apecifioally, many of the
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principles and much of the organisation of powers had already been set.
If any more of the foundation needed to be laid, it would be left to a 
convention for specifically that purpose.
The one principle which has been demanded in American govenment in 
order to better secure our rights is that of republicanism. Thti 
Constitution declared that, "The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government..." And the
writings of the Framers treat the concept as fundamental. But republican 
government meant different things to the Founders of the American nation.
While different voices in the young nation saw the best form of 
republican government differently, there seems to be one common theme at 
the root of these notions. In a republic the people (the public or 
popular will) has a regular and significant impact on the policy 
process. It was the common opinion among all of the delegates and others 
who Influenced American government that neither expertise nor especially 
divine right were sufficient for good government. Professors Kurland and 
Lemer put it the following way, "At the core of the notion of 
republican government appears to be the principle that the many should 
rule, and the body politic 'should move that way whither the greater 
force carries it, which is the consent of the majority' (Locke). Which 
way the greater force moved was for the people to determine, consulting 
their interests and their better second thoughts."(22] The last sentence 
of the quotation turns on the equally important aspect of republican 
government that separates it from straight democracy or mob rule. 
Government was to be arranged so that the crass whim of the masses did 
not rule.
Hothing more was required of a republic. And many arrangements might 
serve the foregoing ends. We will do best when judging republican
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government to remember the words of John Adams, who spent his life trying 
to define republicanism, ”0f Republics, there is an inexhaustable 
variety, because of the possible combination of powers of society, are 
capable of innumerable variations.”[23]
My final measure of good government is its ability or tendency to 
foster self-government. The uniquely American search for better 
government has always emphasized the belief that the perfect government 
would be no government ac all. This idea is intimately intertwined with 
the self-evident truth that ”all Men are created equal,” returning once 
again to the Declaration of Independence. The great prophets of this 
message are of course Thomas Paine and Alexis de Toqueville in his book 
Dei: jcracy in America
Let us hence embark on an analysis of the relationship between the 
States and the Supreme Court, judging it benefit ion and affectiveness on 
the three criteria already outlined. I hold these pii ciples to be 
self-evident[ 24 ], that government should be instit»i*»by the people to 
better secure their rights, that when it becomes destructive of these 
ends it is their right to replace it; that republican government is best 
suited to secure these rights in the American nation) and that a further 
end of state power should be to promote self-government.
II
a/hilti the Constitution of 1?0? has required some fine tuning over 
tha past two nundred years, only once have amendments challenged the very 
t a nets on which it was structured—  when the 13 th, 14 th, and 13th 
amendments redefined citizenship. let in this paper I am impressed 
that I have isolated a most pernicious imbalance of power within our 
constitutional system. The relationship between the Supreme Court 
and the States has historically been and continues to bb one of 
master and vassals. I will endeavor to show that this imbalance has 
ravaged our federal system; and is consequently undemocratic and 
anti-republican. It should therefore be altered. And the challenge 
before us is to determine such an alteration which can be facilitated in 
an overall beneficial way, keeping in mind the objectives of 
government outlined in the introduction.
The quintessence of this thesis is that the relationship 
between the Federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, and the 
States is constitutionally unhealthy, but that this relationship may 
still be appropriately altered by the States in a legal and Constitutional 
fashion.
Consistent with this thesis, we will first look at our constitutional 
checks fluid balances fluid the historical imbalance of power between the 
states fluid the national government, due to a lack of any check on the 
Judiciary within the local arsenal. Then I will point up the treachery 
that has been wrought and is potential under the current arrangement. 
Finally we will turn to a discussion of remedy. This section of 
the paper will be very much concerned with the prospects of Amending’r
th. Constitution with th. aid of a constitutional convention.
It ia th. politics! natur. of th. Supssw Court witloh SaStaad. it 
so ssnseisKto tilt stStss. A. c m  of th. thzoo gnat fenaohss of Aatrloan
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national government, the Supreme Court has gained an appettite for policy 
making. We all know that our system of government is based on checks and 
balances. Yet we hope that the Supreme Bench of the nation renders its 
findings independent of political considerations. But if the wisdom of 
the Constitution is based on the creations of it being influenced in 
their behavior by the powers of the other players in the political drama, 
then logic insists that the Supreme Court's actions are influenced by its 
struggle for power with the executive and the legislature. We shall be 
able to conclude from the forthcoming evidence that the Supreme Court is 
especially influenced by a preoccupation with maintaining its own power 
and integrity.
Practice supports our logic. The history of the nation is littered 
with examples of judicial politics (more commonly labled "judicial 
statecraft.") While it is difficult to prove motive, the preponderance 
of the evidence leaves us no room but to conclude that many decisions were 
politically motivated. And historians have so concluded. Alan Westin 
has deseibed the Court's "unwritten rules when reviewing politically 
charged" cases
a, When the political situation ie too dangerous for the Supreme 
Court, the Court should find a way to duck the issue or to deflect 
it, leaving its immediate resolution to the larger political process.
b. But if the political situation is favorable then the Court is free 
to do the two things most beloved by American judges*** uphold the 
'rule of lew1 against claims of prerogative or privilege..., sad 
expand still further the discretionary power of the judiciary in the 
American constitutional system.
Here Hr. Westin is speaking specifically of the Court's approach to the 
executive breach. But it is obvious that the Court would adapt similar 
measures for say politically charged situation*
The curtain rimes on the Supreme Gourt*s role in our political 
drama in the year 1801. Thomas Jefferson has wen the Presidency, and 
hln Republicans have forever banished the Federalists from centre! «f
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the political branches of the government. The Federalists have already 
filled the judiciary with their own appointments, but this is not 
enough. In the final hours of their tenure, a Federalist congress 
grossly expands the federal judiciary and President John Adams makes 
the appointments. Thus setting the stage for the most dramatic 
constitutional struggle in the history of the nation. The Federalist 
judiciary is pitted against the Republicans in the executive and 
legislative branches.
The partisan character of the struggle has constitutional 
implications, as it shapes forever the character of the Supreme Court, 
Today we applaud the great "judicial statesman," Chief Justice John 
Marshall for having saved the integrity of the courts and for 
establishing judicial review. But let us not be deceived as to how 
these feats were accomplished and are maintained, in 1803, Marshall 
handed down Marbuiy v. Madison, the comer atom of judi ial review and 
the gateway toward judicial supremacy. This case was id :r. inception 
a focal point of national politics. The ieput lie os hat; thr *tt ned 
to impeach Marshall if he ordered the President. t de liver t Marbuiy 
his certification as a federal judge. o: n Marshall pulied off the
greatest coup in the history cf American poliics the day he handed 
down Marbuiy. He avoided confrontation wit 1 ho politically powerful 
Republicans "and expanded still rther the the discretionary power 
of the judiciary,*' in one fell swoop. Trie political intensity of the 
day is pointed up by a letter th Chief Justice sent to Supr* me Court 
Juatioe Samuel Chase in which he Ind cated that he would be tiling to 
surrender the doctrine of judicial supremacy in exchange for immunity
'U
frm impeach^ . t, auv t the fact that Justice Chase was la ter
27impeme&cib for his 'wmbrnsfoedly partisan manipulation of his office.
Itse lessons cf the early 1800a h ve never been lost on the
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members of the Court. And while as a legalistic institution the 
Court is often slow to discern popular currents, once ttwy have been 
forced on its attention, the Court has responded according to Mr.
Westin's rules. The most dramatic turn-around in the Court's 
history has come to be known as the "Revolution of 19)7." Previous 
to the Revolution, the Supreme Court struck down New Deal iawa, one 
after another, maintaining a strict constructionist view of the commerce 
clause. Following his second election, President Franklin Roosevelt 
tried to pack the Court. Congress refused to pass legislation that 
would have allowed the President to appoint one new justice to the 
High Court for every one that failed to retire by a certain age.
But themovement apparently gained enough support to scare the 
•nine old men," For in NLRB v, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, the 
Courtopened the door to greater national regulation of comerce by# as 
dissenting Justice McReynolds wrote, "departing'from well-established 
principles followed in A,L,A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States
OQ
decided only two years earlier.c Other examples of the Court's 
statecraft include the Steel leisure Cases and Unit* States v. Nixon,
In both cases the Court used a favorable political climate to answer 
constitutional questions in its own favor,
We have found this acceptable not because the Supreme Court is 
blatantly arbitrary in its renderings, but because aa the system is 
balanced, the court has been able to maintain some degree of 
judicial independence. A sense of comity among the three branches of 
the national government has allowed each of them to maintain their 
own integrity. There have been several historical struggles, and 
tiia living system is in constant flux. But in the long run the 
pendulum uwings back, and we remain impressed that this fora of 
governing is fulfilling its promise.2^
But there are a group of political institutions—  intergal parts of 
American government—  which have little influece on any of the national 
institutions and effectively none on the Supreme Court. The state 
governments have no 1 t check on the Supreme Court. The peple do 
elect the Congress and the President based on state jurisdictions, but 
role of the states proves to be insufficient to protect the states 
from national encroachment, particularly that perpetrated by the Court. 
This is so for two reasons; the governments of the states are not at 
all involved in the selection of the national government any more, 
since the institution of popular election of Senatorsi and even if the 
states could check the Congress, any resulting influence over the Court 
is considerably deluted by the tenuous connection through the Congress.
We shall see that history supports this.
The product of all this is that as the three branches of the 
national government struggle to make: policy the states are brushed 
aside. The states are powerless to resist any national encroachment.
And if the national institutions do not aid and abett one another in 
plundering the localities, they at least permit it. There have been 
individual justicies and individual courts which have seen protection 
of states' rights as a fundamental mission of the Court. And when 
such an attitude has prevailed on the Bench, the cause of federalism has 
been progressed. But for the most part quite the opposite i m  been the 
trend. The Supreme Court's role in this is particularly odious, since 
it takes the corm of judicial supremacy unchecked by popular restraints. 
The Supreme Court is also the ultimate culprit in that it has taken 




Much of this paper is couched in terras of the Supreme Court's 
responsibility and culpability, This language is in a sense misleading, 
as the Court is not a creature entirely of its own design. The fact is 
that the Framers of the Constitution did not provide a bulwark capable 
of managing the coming exigencies of federalism. The subject of the 
viability ofstate sovereignty was probably the foremost issue in the 
minds of those who debated the ratification of the Constitution. But 
on several issues which have come to create the present situation the 
Framers were less than prescient.
The first fact that points up the Founders' failure is their 
general inattention to the the Supreme Court. The language of 
Article II! of the Constitution is wide open. And in the Federalist
papers, the authors recognize the Court's jurisdiction over the states,
. , . 30but summarily dismiss it, without discussion, as necessary, A more
appropriate approach would have been to consider the ramifications of
this necessary jurisdiction and to design the government so to soften its
harsher consequences.
These otherwise astute men misread the potential of judicial 
review* Alexander Hamilton said, in effect, that the Court would have 
neither the Will nor the Force" to prove tyrannical. The activities of 
Warren Court of alone arc enough to disprove the "Will" part of that 
contention. And it seems that the Court ever-increasingly has the 
"Force" of expedience and tradition with it. We feel compelled to 
abide by its findings, in order to preserve the rule of law.
Actually the opponents of the Constitution proved more prescient than 
Hamilton and company. Mr. Hamilton quoted their contention in his 
Federalist #81 *
The authority of the proposed Supreme Court of the United States,
which is to be a separate and independent body, will be superior
\
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to that of the legislature. The power of construing the laws 
according to the spirit of the Constitution will enable the Court 
to mould them into whatever shape it may think proper* especially 
as its decisions will not be in any manner subject to the 
revision or correction of the legislative body. This is as 
unprecedented as it is dangerous.
The Federalist response to this was as follows!"^
It may be observed that the supposed danger of judiciary 
encroachment on the legislative authority which has upon manv 
occasions reiterated 5^  in reality a phantom. Particular 
misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the legislature 
may now and then happen* but they can never be so extensive as to 
affect the order of the political system.
Hamilton's last statement has proved incorrect. He based this
contention on the Constitutional provision allowing the Congress to
32impeach justices. And elsewhere in the Federalist Papers, Congress'
power to define the judiciary was pointed out as a potent check
against judicial encroachments. Fven if these did constitute
effective checks gainst judicial mischief, neither provision is at the
disposal of the state legislatures. And It is here where our concern
lies and where the greatest alterations to "the order of the political
system" has occured. Furthermore, both of these measures are much
too unwieldly to exercise on a regular basis, particularly impeachment.
And Congress apparently cannot strip the Court of jurisdiction
without depriving the nation of some due process.
All of these misreadings come to a head in the fact that the
Constitution provides no definitive vehicle for resolving federal-state
contro-ersies, short of dissolution of the Union. In Federalist #33
Alexander Hamilton recognises that national usurpations may occur. And
he indicates that any extra-Constitutional act of the national government
would fall to be the "supreme law of the land." He says,
But it will not follow from this doctrine that acts of the larger 
society which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers, but 
whioh axe invasions of the residuaxy authorities of the smaller 
societies, will become the law of the lad* Thase will be merely 
acta of usurpation, and will deserve to be treated as such*
4 .■■ !■ t
This statement provides only one possible remedy to national 
encroachment, nullification.
We are familiar with the fate of the doctrine of nullification.
It of course cannot work. If the states are allowed to determine 
which laws are Constitutional and which are not, federal law fails to 
be supreme in any meaningful sense. A government whose laws are 
subject to the caprice of the governed for their legitimacy is no 
government at all. fn the 1030s, President Andrew Jackson settled the 
matter for good by threatening to use force against South Carolina over 
nullification.
But the idea of nullification did not originate with John
Calhoun. In audition to the intimations of Alexander Hamilton, the
doctrine of nullification was promulgated in the Kentucky resolutions of
1799 and the Virginia resolutions of 1800, The respective authors of
34these were none other than Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
35Andrew McGlaughlin says concerning their purpose
In any attemot to evaluate or understand the protests that came 
from these two men, we must bear in mind not only their desire to 
defend individual liberty, but (perhaps chiefly) their antagonism 
to a Federalist system of constitutional interpretation which they 
feared would make of the Constituion nothing but a scrap of paper. 
They determined to call the attention of the country to the fact 
that, on proper ' onstituional principles, the government was a 
limited government, not to be magnified into omnipotence by 
cunning construction.
With the author of the Declaration of Independence and the Father the 
Constitution struggling to find a means to limit the federal government 
and arriving at the implausible doctrine of nullification (at a time 
when considerable effort was being made to follow the intent of the 
Constitution,) can there be any doubt but that the Constitution was 
defective on this point.
In the Federalist Papers, Madison went further to suggest armed 
resistance to federal encroachment into state affaire. Me believed
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that the state cr states would prevail. Our one and decisive 
experience on this natter has proven him decisively wrong. He and 
Alexander Hamilton misread the nature of such a conflict on several 
points. Their first error was in thinking that the states would unite 
in such a struggle against the central government. Madison put it 
this wayr
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government on the 
authority the State governments would not excite the opposition 
of a single State, or of a few States only, They would be 
signals of general alarm. Every government would espouse the 
common cause, A correspondence would be opened. Plans of 
resistance would be concerted. One spirit would animate the whole.
Hamilton adds to this that while the central government was putting
down one part of the nation in rebellion, another would rise against
it. The central government would be unable to subdue all of the states,*^
We have learned from the Civil War that the central government would not
necessarily have to subdue all of the states, The Federalists should
have reasoned that many issues would divide the states. Right in
Federalist #46 James Madison drew the proper analogy to our differences
with Great Britain, He said, "In the contest with Great Britain, one
part of the empire was employed against the other. The more numerous
part invaded the rights of the less numerous part," But then he
abandoned this line of reasoning, "but what would be the contest in
the case we are supposing? who would be the parties? A few
representatives of the people would be opposed to the people
the twelves i or rather one set of representatives against thirteen sets
of representatives,,..." This has never been the case.
They also believed that the people would remain loyal to the
states over the central government. The end of the last quote is, "with
the whole body of their common constituents on the side of the latter,"
(the States).^ Thus not foreseeing the fores of nationalism which
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would come to dominate the world. Hamilton claimed that States woulc 
have the financial wherewithal to provide for their defense. One 
of the great fears of the Anti-federalists was that the national 
government would impose so great a tax burden as to dry up the states' 
revenues. In Federalist //32, Hamilton dismisses such a possibility 
as impossible, due to its unpopularity among the people. In an era 
when the national government blackmails the states into submission with 
the threat of withholding funds, we can easily conclude that it was the 
Constitution's detractors who were right about this issue. (At least 
since the unfortunate advent of the 16th Amendment.) And finally the 
Federalists tell us that the central government will not be willing to 
pay the enormous price that subduing a state states will cost. Madison's 
words in Federalist #kC are*
On the other hand should an unwarrantable measure of the federal 
government be unpopular in particular states, which would seldom 
fail to be thecase, the means of opposition are powerful and at 
hand* The disquietude of the peoples their repugnance and, 
oerhans, refusal to cooperate with the officers of the Unions the 
frowns of the executive sagistracy of the State* the embarrdaments 
created by legislative devices, which would often be added on such 
occasions, would oppose in any State, difficulties not to be 
despised) would form, in a large State very serious impedimentss 
and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happen to 
be in vuison, would present obstructions which the federal 
government would hardly be willing to encounter.
Madison was absolutely right about how high the price would be, but
fortunately Abraham Lincoln was willing to ’encounter* it, when the
occasion arose.
Neither nullification, armed resistance, nor the natural 
combination of the two are appropriate means of protecting the states 
from national encroachment, if this nation was to long survive. But 
tk* Federalists did foreee how some fede misstate conflicts would be 
settled. They admitted that the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction
39over the states when a federal question was at hand.*'7 They could not
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say that the Court would protect the states} the Anti-federalists 
would never have fallen for this. But this is what was in effect 
created, Over anguished cries from the states, the Court began handing 
down decisions on the federal questions, and in response declared 
itself perfectly capable of protecting the states from central 
manipulation.
At least since John Marshall sat the bench, the Supreme Court has 
maintained itself as the "final authority" concerning the extent of state 
powers. Mr. McGlaughlin writes of Marshall, "The greatest task of all 
had been the establishment of the Court as the recognized authority in 
determining the extent of the state*s poweri he had not failed}
And he goes on to report that Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Roger 
Brooke Taney continured the fight to solidify the Court's authority 
over the states. The thrust of this thesis is that the Court is not 
capable of protecting the states from centi 1 usurpation, The states 
realized early on that their destiny did net look bright tied to the 
star of the Supreme Court. McGlaughlin continues, "(B)ut almost to 
the very end of his (John Marshall's) life he found one state after 
another denying the Court's authority or even, as in the case of 
Georgia, flouting it,"^
Before we get lost in peripheral history, the point here is that 
the Framers of the Constitution, though their rhetoric declaims any 
attempt to do so, set the stage for the downfall of the states, at
ixothe hand of the Supreme Court. Mr. Walter Bems summarizes it so well*
The authors of the Federalist might seed to discount it by 
arguing that the more likely danger was state usurpation of 
national authority, but their arguments, whatever their effect on 
the issue then at stake—  the ratification of the new 
Constitution— are not convincing to us who read them with the 
advantage of a knowledge of subsequent events.
iough I freely admit that there have been a f unforeseeable ’ h
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subsequent events which may have quickened the demise of the states. 
(Though under a more balanced system these events would probably be 
only eddies overrun by the general current.) One in particular is 
the ascendency of John Marshall as the individual most responsible 
for the American jurisprudence. His ideology was extremely nationalistic, 
and with good cause. He had seen the travesty of an impotent 
national government, as a soldier at Valley 1* oige. The Sixteenth
Amendment was also an unfortunate development. And it would be 
unreasonable to expect the delegates of 1787 to foresee the technological 
developments of the 1980s or even the 19 0^s which have made the 
national military arsenal so formidible.
Ill
While John Marshall's personal philosophy may he understandable, 
we should not condone its being foisted upon the American people as the 
standing constitutional doctrine for centuries to come. I am committed 
to the idea that the nature of government is best defined by the governed, 
not by one person or a small group of persons exclusively. Besides 
being improperly implemented, Marshall's philosophy is inconsistent with 
the tenets of federalism, a practice which I will indicate is essential 
to good government. The Supreme Court to this day continues a systematic 
erosion of local power, In 1959 in response to what he considered an 
attempt by Virginia to circumvent the Court's will, Justice William 
0, Douglas declared, MIn this context there is no longer any basis for 
being polite to Virginia) this is war!" His candor, if not his 
attitude, is refreshing. Perhaps if John Marshall had been so forthright 
ijO years earlier, the states would have had a fighting chance in the 
struggle. An historical review of the Supreme Court's development of 
several Constitutional doctrines will point upits arrogance and 
inconsistency, and it will introduce us to the oligarchical nature of 
this arrangement and the perils it presents.
As alluded to earlier, the assault on the states began very early 
in the history of the Constitution, When John Marshall decided 
McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819 he enunciated the doctrine of "national 
supremacy,H That some idea of national supremacy is indicated in the 
Constitution is irrefutable. But Marshall's dictum in this case 
opened a floodgate of national encroachment. The problem here is that 
the Court's approach to thes has been to view national rights as 
immitigable, but to see the states' rights as dispsnslble, Sxcept for 
during a short period of time, the Court has allowed any legitimate
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national power to deprive the states of any of their powers. Any 
federal interest, no matter how minor or tenuous, is viewed as having 
greater weight than all of the legitimate interests of the states, no 
matter how fundamental or essential to order they are. With the 
coupling of this with the 'necessary and proper" clause, as Marshall did 
in McCulloch, the national government can deprive the states of any and 
all privileges.
A more reasoned reading of the Constitution could have produced a 
more balanced government. In his decision, Marshall suggests that the 
power to tax is the power to destroy and/or to alter, He of course wants 
to prevent the states from destroying the national government, but 
finds it perfectly acceptable for the national government to have 
such power over the states. In his decision Marshall notes a 
contention by the State of Maryland, which, though somewhat awkward, 
would prove to be much more amenable to the preservation of the intent 
of the Constitution than Marshall's lopsided doctrine. He states* "The 
argument on the part of the State of Maryland, is , not that the States 
may directly resist a law of Congress, but that they may exercise their 
acknowledged powers upon it, and that the Constitution leaves them this 
right in confidence that they will not abuse it,"^ While the actual 
nature of how the system would operate under such a doctrine is 
somewhat unpredictable, it is likely that a sense of comity would 
develop among the governments, as it has among the branches of 
federal government.
Still it would be even better to avoid the whole mess by having a 
tribunal willing to weigh in the balance all legitimate Constitutional 
interests when a question of federalism presents itself* This has 
proven the most judicious means of reconciling almost all conflicting
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claims of Constitutional privilege. And it was practiced with regard
tc whe states and the national government for a brief time. The doctrine
is known as "dual federalism." It was first used in Collector v. Day 
linin 1871. The doctrine was best promulgated by Justice Roberts in 
United States v. Butlcr(1936). Robert Cushman characterizes this 
particular example thus, ’The Court does not contend that such a 
processing tax, taken alone, would be void; but when coupled with a clear 
attempt to regulate agriculture, it was an unconstituional use of the
f8delegated power,"
The greatest casualty of the Revolution of 1937 wan dual federalism, 
Cushman calls it "destined to be short-lived." And he is correct when 
one considers the nature of the Court. One year after Butler, the Court 
reversed it in the Social Security Act Cases, In 1976 there was a weak 
attempt to resurrect dual federalism in National League of Cities v. . 
usery(19?6). But it was quickly aborted.
The greatest damage wrought by "national supremacy" has come, as 
McCulloch v. Maryland predicted, from the power to tax, exacerbated by 
the Sixteenth Amendment, The federal government constantly forces 
states to conform to the national program and agenda, with the threat 
of withholding funds. Such a practice should be prima facie 
unconstitutional, for it is an improper use of delegated powers of 
taxing and spending. The question is asked whether the federal 
government is to have no power to place conditions on the use of 
federal money, at least aceountir^  controls to prevent fraud. The 
answer to this is that the federal government should not be in the 
business of dispensing to the states funds to build up their etates.
There is no need, and certainly no Constitutional prevision for the 
national government to collect taxes and than redistribute them
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among the states. If the money is not for a national purpose, it should 
be left in the hands of the people of the individual states. If it 
is for a national purpose, then the fedezal government is perfectly 
capable of executing it on its own.
The second development of the Supreme Court to which we will 
draw our attention is the expansion of the commerce clause. This too was 
greatly precipitated by the Revolution of 1937• But I see this expansion 
of federal power as the most appropriate, even essential. The presence 
of Congress* commerce power negates any claims that there can be no 
national influence on domestic affairs under a true Constitutional 
scheme. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power 
to regulate and facilitate interstate commerce,^ With the increase 
in interstate trade in the modem era, it is only apprpriate that the 
duties of the Congress should expand. We are blessed with a national 
legislature which can increase the efficiency of the interstate commerce 
and prtect the citizenry from commerce which takes on harmful or 
repugnant forms. It can protect the environment! fight racism} manage 
limited resources which are essential to interstate commerce, such as 
the airways or airwaves} and prevent fraudulent practices. It would be 
a foolish locality indeed which did not demand, such protection, so far 
as it was strictly interstate.
Even with the national government's most plenary domestic power, 
the Supreme Court could not find it within its grace to be moderate, 
balsnced9 or restrained. Congress has gome to control, under the 
commerce clause, not only interstate commerce and that which ; 
significantly affects interstate commerce, but also anything that has 
anytning remotely to do with interstate commercet that means everything.
I recognise that developing & jurisprudence which draws a line between
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interstate and intrastate commerce is no simple ■ But the Court
has not even attempted it, but has instead adopt* t e r. *, simplistic
of solutions—  anything may be considered inters!a:: commerce, the
Court certainly breached that fine line in Katzenbach v. HcClung(196b).
In this case the Court declared that Ullie’c UarUeue of blrming ham,
Alabama could be regulated by the Congress because J >:' the food
he served, was purchased from a local supplier who .oocured it
from outside the State, This restraunt operated and advertized locally;
it even had a take-out service. ^  It therefore did not constitute
int€?rstate commerce, nor have any effect on it. The District Court
which the Highest Court had reversed in .,his decision applied the proper
reasoning. Hr, Justice Clark speakings of the lower T.ecision,^ '
As to the Commerce Clause, the court found..,that the clause was,., 
a grant o f power to regulate intrastate activities, but only to 
the extent that action on its part is necessary and appropriate to 
the effective execution of its expressly granted power to regulate 
interstate commerce. There must be, it sa'd, a close and 
substantial relation between local activities and interstate 
commerce which requires control of the former in the protection of 
the latter.
This was consistent with .Supreme Court's reason!ng in Heart of Atlanta 
Hotel v. United States(l96^where the Court allowed the Congress to 
regulate a motel which solicited and received considerable business from
outside of the state, and which obviously affected other interstate
53commerce. But Mr, Clark and his colleagues chose to expand this beyond 
any restrictions in Katzenbach,
Let us move on to more pernicious forms of judicial tyranny. After 
the Civil War the nation passed three amendments in order to end slavery, 
and to prevent a de facto subjugation of former slaves. It might well 
be said that the Fourteenth Amendment, the middle one of the three, was 
intended to protect against legal or official discrimination. But 
the Supreme Court has used two of its clauses to dismantle the State
PAGE 30
republics, The first is the due process, and the second is the 
equal protection clause. We shall see that the Court’s application of 
these clauses has been inconsistent with the intent of the amendment,
with the Constitution renerally, and witn any concept of .logic. 'ho 
b re them have used -.he equal protection clause to deprive the people 
of the rbOit to u :'ino tluhr executive and legislative b rancher. and 
the due process clause to do the same with respect to the local 
judiciary.
The Court's approach to the due process clause has come to he Jen own
as "incorporation,” In short, it is the belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the state; to abide by the national bill of Rights,
While a majority of the Court ha? never embraced such a view, it is a
policy which, nevertheless, is steadilybeing implemented by the Court.
The history of the Court's development of the doctrine of "selective
incorporation" demonstrates how the federal judiciary stealthily strips
the states of all sovereignty. In 1930 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
sounded a warning against this trend. He wrote in Baldwin v, Missouri*
I have not yey adequatelyexpressed the more than anxiety I feel 
at the ever-increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in 
cutting down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the 
states. As the decisions now stand, I see hanily any limit but 
the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to 
strike a majority of this court as for any reason undesirable, I 
cannot believe that the amendment was intended to give us carte 
blanche to embody our economic or social beliefs in its 
prohibitions...."
There has probably never been a statement of greater insight or foresight 
issued from the Supreme Court.
In Twining v. New Jersey (1908), the Supreme Court recognized that 
"it is possible that some of the personal rights guarded by the first 
eight amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against
state action, because a denial of them would be denial of due process."^
\
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An innocent enough statement. That the authors of the 'ourteenth 
Amendment had included the phrase due process in the Amendment, indicates
that they thought there were wome essentials to a judicial process which
.ire ''undameuial to the rlph which they hoped tc pn serve for clacks,
that some of Uiese had been acknowledged in the sill of Rights
hardly seems like far-fetched idea* out. historical evidence does not
lead us to believe that the Bill of Rights was to be the standard.
Raoul Berger writes that, "to read the bill of Rights into * privileges
and immunities* is therefore no more reasonable than to read a •bill
56of attainder' into 'habeous corpus."'"
lor the Court to mention the Bill of Rights while discussing 
fundamental right is probably natural, but unfortunate, because 
Justices quickly came up with the idea of incorporation. They soon 
would require the states to implement trial by jury (Duncan v.
Louisiana), unanimous jury convictions, Miranda readings| and the 
Court's views on cruel and unusual punishment (Furman v,Georgia,
Coker v. Georgia, Harry Roberts v. Louisiana), unlawful search and 
seizure (Ohio v, Mapp), and right to counsel (Gideon v. Wainwright). I he 
doctrine became known as "selective incorporation!" in effect it meant 
that whenever the Court encountered the opportunity, it would incorporate 
its own views of what due process meant onto the states.
It is ironic indeed that that the Bill of Rights, designed, 
by those who wanted to protect the states and their people, to keep 
the national government as a limited government, is now being 
used for exactly the opposite, as an instrument for the national 
government to limit the powers of the states. Both those who favor 
full incorporation and these who have sought to let the states 
define due process for themselves have expounded on the irrationality
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and capriciouaness of selective incorporation. But, as noted by
Justice Hugo Black, a full incorporc ioniot, the practice of selective
incorporation in much more amenable to incorpora tioriist theory than to
37state : ova re lgnty* The dissensions in these decisions are full of
misgivings about the harm to justice done by forcing uniformity on to 
the nation's judicial systems. Justice Peli> Frankfurter is first among 
his peers in denouncing selective incorporation, as he is first in
Somany things. He writes in his concurrence in Adamson v. California*^
A construction ’•Jich gives to due process no independent function 
but t v it into a summary of specific provisions of the Bill of 
Bights (would)'deprive the States of opportunity for reforms in 
legal process designed for extending freedom. It would assume 
that no other abuses would reveal themselves in the course of time 
than those which had become manifest in 1791.
Thus he states that judicial process is a complex matter, deserving
sophisticated and intimate analysis across both space and time, He
notes the tyranny of arbitrarily assigning naive preconditions to all
due process in the nation. And Justice John Harlan continues the fight
for federalism valiantly and eloquently. He notes in his Malloy v.
Hogan dissent the benefits of federalism and the stagnation which arises
from its demises^
The consequence is inevitably disregard of all relevant differences 
which may exist between state and federal criminal law and its 
enforcement* The ultimate result compelled uniformity, which 
is inconsistent with the purposes of our federal system and 
which is achieved either by encroachment on the State's sovereign 
powers or by dilution in federal law enforcement of the specific 
protections in the Bill of Rights.
He continues in Baldwin v. New York*
(These decisions) demonstrate that the difference between a 'due 
process* approach, that considers each particular case on its 
bottom to see whether the right alleged is one 'implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty,' and 'selective incorporation* is 
not an abstract one whereby different verbal formulae achieve the 
same results. The internal logic of the selective incorporation 
cannot be respected if the Court is both committed to interpreting 
faithfully the meaning of the federal Bill of Rights and recognizing 




•backlash1 in Williams exposes the malaise, for there the Court 
dilutes a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of 
'incorporation,' the *jct-for-jot, and case-for^ case' application of 
the federal right to the States, with the reality of federalism.
thus he points out how this middling uniformity hurts both federal and
local due process. Fundamental to the thinking of Frankfurter and
harlan, arid alien to the theory of incorporation, is the underlying
faith in the people of each state to preserve due process, through
their own judiciary e. i republican government.
If we could come to accept all three of the judicial doctrines
just discussed above, the one that follows would be sufficient to
demand an alteration in our government. When the federal judiciary
chose to reapportion the states according to Its own current philosophy
of the best form of representation, it destroyed any hope of a peaceful
resolution to Justice Douglas's "war." Traditionally apportionment
had been held as a political question, and therefore beyond the Court's
jurisdiction. But in 1962 the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr, and
began to change all of that. As is often the case, the holding in Baker
v. Carr was not nearly so irresponsible as the dicta wore reckless.
Justice Potter Stewart approached the subject rather moderately when
he wrote, "Contrary to my Brother Harlan, the Court does not say or
imply that 'state legislatures must be so structured as to reflect with
approximate equality of every voter* (or) that there is anything in the
Federal Constitution 'to prevent a State acting not irrationally, from
choosing any electoral legislative structure it thinks best suited to
6lthe interests, temper, and customs of the people.'u
But Justice Stewart probably should have said that that was not 
what he was doing. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter responded with shock 
as they correctly read the implications of the majority opinion. In
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this opinion the Court first raise the spectre of Mequal protection/’
It declared itself the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution." 
Probably most significant, it declared that the state governments were 
not entitled to any consideration of political questions. Thus the 
Court was able to ignore its own enumeration of possible* political 
questions, which the Court would rome to throw to the wind with respect 
to the states. Further it had taken upon itself the stewardship of 
determining whether an apportionment plan was reasonable or rational in 
all of its complexity. Final/, the majority opinion here first sung 
the praises of one man, one vote, calling H  "the basic principle of 
representative government/' In short, the Court had demanded that 
apportionment be "fair, as defined by whatever court might be hearing 
the case.
As surely as Harlan and Frankfurter had predicted the Court soon 
adopted these principles under the guise of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Reynolds v. 3ims(l96d) the Court 
demanded that both houses of a state's legislature be apportioned 
according t©population—  one man, one vote—  in order to be fair. 
Following the reasoning of Baker* the Justices declared this to be the 
intent cf the Constitution. They dismissed with the design of the 
Congress as having historical significance which has nothing to do 
with state government, And concerning the only other Constitutional 
precedent of an electoral scheme, the Court labled the Electoral College 
as archaic. Having summarily thrown out any real Constitutional 
precedent, they were free to force upon states their version of the 
Constitution.
And this they did to the fullest extent, leaving only Justice Harlan 
to mom the demise of the Constitution. Not even Hr. Frankfurter could
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predict what ominous form this judicial monster would take on. His
declaration that surely the courts would not take it upon themselves to 
reapportion the state legislatures had already been proven false. The 
Court had in effect struck down most of the state apportionment plans 
in the nation, U haa rocbed them of the privilege of dealing with the 
complexities and h'.,tory of their own state, by djtying the existence of 
such. The Court forsake any pretense of protecting the unexpressed will 
of the majorities of the states when it decided Lucas v. Colorado 
General Assembly on .he same day as H*ynoids, In this case the people 
of Colorado had rejected a system that would have provided equal 
popular representation, by a two-to-one margin in a popular referendum, 
But the Court had committed itself to this ludicrous doctrine, so it 
struck down the Colorado Constitution, saying, ‘a citizen's rights can 
hardly be ir nged simply because a majority of the people choose to do 
ao."62
The last quote demonstrates how fair afield from the Constitution the 
Court had strayed. First of all, there is no fundamental right to 
vote, like a right to freedom of religion or the pursuit of happiness. 
Some people feel that the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments set a 
precedent for a right tv vote. Actually there amendments recognised the 
states1 s power to limit the franchise by lorbidding them to use gender or 
race as criteria. If the Fourteenth Amendment had guaranteed a right 
to vote, then there would have been no need for the 15th, 19th, and 26th 
Amendments. Voters are merely an instalment toward making the government 
move responsive, a part of the constitution, like the legislature or the 
judiciary. To have one or two houses of the Assembly districted other 
than by a population basis, does not deprive the people of their cheek 
on legislation. But it may allow minorities to check the tyranny of a
majority. PAGE 36
My reasoning is of course not at all novel. It is that of 
virtual representation, it is the idea that one's interest may be 
represented by different means, it is a concept which has literally 
dominated Anglo*American tradition, When we broke with the British, we 
did not reject virtual representation. We merely declared that the 
preponderance of the evidence suggested that we were not enjoying it.
And in 178?, the Constitutional Convention embraced the idea in designing 
the new government. he Electoral College which a few justices tabled
a. archaic in the earl/ 1960s elected a president in 19$+, Justice
63Frankfurter's reply in bakerj J
the notion that representation proportioned to the geographic 
spread of population is so universally accepted as a necessary 
element of equality between man and man that it must be taken to 
be the standard of a political equality preserved by the 
Fourteenth Amendment—  that it is, in the appellant's words 
"the basic principle of representative government"—  is, to put 
it bluntly, not true. However desirable and however desired by 
some among the great political thinkers and framers of our 
government* it has never been generally practiced, today or in 
the past. It was not the English systemt it was not the colonial 
system, it was not the system chosen for the national government , 
by the Constitution, it was not the system exclusively or even 
predominately practiced by the States at the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it is not predominately practiced by the 
States today.
Any doubt as to the Supreme Court's antipathy toward the states 
should now have been put to rest. The fairness principle becomes 
absolutely farcical when viewed in light of other "unfair* practices 
whloh the Court has chosen to ignore. For example, if the Court was 
really concerned with fairness in government it would have tried to 
abolish the congressional committee system, which is patently unfair.
Both houses of congress are organised into a hierarchical system of 
commitee8. At the peak of the house is the Speaker* This s true tux* 
determines what legislation will cone before the House or the Senate,
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and those with powerful positions have undue influence over what 
legislation is passed and what form it takes. These include the 
Speaker, committee and subcommittee chairmen, and even members of 
certain key committees, tfhile some representatives have very 
11 tile influence over the legislative process, A district's 
representative is at an immediate disadvantage if he h  from the 
minority party, because he will be unable to chair a committee nor 
have much influence over those who do or the Speake , , gets to
determine which comri\tee will get to debate and draft a bill for any 
particular proposal. his system deprives many districts and states 
of their effective voice in congress,,making it a little pointless for 
the Court to worry about how he was selected. It is clear from its 
history that it is a system developed to serve certain vested intersts.
But if the Court were to challenge such a clear congressional 
prerogative, Congress might very well gut the Court. Go the Brethem 
rather cowardly pick on the states.
IV
11 h; not at all unreasonable to classify wuch arbitrariness as 
tyranny. And the first casualties of this tyranny are legitimate 
government, constitutionalism, and the Constitution, John Harlan 
concludes in his Reynold dissent that tne Court*s action **amounts to 
nothing less than an exercise of the amending power,* We remember that 
the Declaration of Independence reserved this privilege for the people. 
Judicial supremacy is inconsistent witn the idea of a government of 
limited powers, one restricted by a written constitution. The Court, 
recognized this when it declared that legislative acts must be 
consistent with the Constitution in order to qualify as law, but 
when it placed itself above the Constitution, it defeated that very idea. 
While the debate over the benificence of judicial review continues to 
this day and good arguments have undermined its legitimacy, I am 
willing to concede it a place in our constitutional system. But it 
becomes intolerable when stretched to a judicial-supremacy extreme 
(particularly when exercised over legislatures which have no means of 
resisting it.)
It is one thing for the court to say that a particular piece 
of legislation cannot be applied as it was in the case it is hearing, 
because such an application would be unconstitutional. It is quite 
another for the Court to try to strike down a whole class of legislation, 
which may have existed since the time of the ratification of the 
Constitution, because it has discovered** a new intent within the 
Constitution or has perceived a change in the constitution of our 
society.which has somehow escaped the perception of the Congress.
Abraham Lincoln noted the need for all of the branches of the government
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to be subject to the bu:feltings of the Constitutional process. In
the debates with Douglas, he declared
We do not propose that when Dred dcott has been decided to be a 
slavu by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free.
We do not propose hat, when any other one, or one thousand, shall 
be decided by the court to be slaves, we sill in any violent way 
disturb the rights of property thus settled? but we nevertheless do 
oppose that decision as a political rule, which shall be binding 
on the voter to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall 
be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no 
measure that doe3 not actually concur w. th the principles of the 
decisi on.
If the Congress has it in its power to resist judicial supre macy—  
and this is highly questionable—  the states do not. The capriciousness 
of the Court has already been demonstrated by its treatment of the states.
It has bent or deformed any Constitutional principle to its own liking, whether 
it be equal protection, federalism, due process, or interstate commerce? 
so that it might destroy other Constitutional provisions. The 
Constitution can hardly be considered intact after such an assault.
Perhaps defend rs of the Court would suggest that the Constitution is 
only meant to be a launching pad for the government. This is 
obviously inconsistent with the Court’s philosophy, but it is 
characteristic for the Court to be deceptive, so perhaps a more Anglican 
conception of constitution is at the root of th# Court’s self-image. But 
if we must have a constitution subject to alteration by its own creations, 
please let it be the legislature, as is the precedent in Eng Ian, and since 
it is  closest to the will of the people. I think the best analysis of 
the situation is that the Court cannot have it both ways. Either it must 
forsake ita supremacy over the Constitution, or it must foresake its 
claim that the Congress cannot exceed the Constitution. Without a firm 
constitution, a strong court has no legitimacy.
The moot prominent damage trough by the current constitutional 
arrangement is the demise of federalism. I have alluded to this often
i A ds AQ
S this pape*; re will .-la ho rate on *1 Another principle of goo
jvsnimeni wn *•h . a:• ,h; u? ve <• j.ai mod us s. tr-ev ideal in the Americas
.us.; s, in the pre fan•t of this pa par, is local rdc of local affairs.
i retrained from do in,, so only because the concept Is no central to 
thin thesis, that I feel it needs to be fully explained within the main 
tody of the paper.
it wan over this principle more than anything else that the
h , stationary far was fourht, Andrew hcdls.yghl in writes;^
the declarations against parlimentaxy taxation included for 
protection of the colonics as constituent part:; of the empire 
to tax themselvess they included, therefore, the striving for 
personal rights and for the r cognition of colonial compe?tence, 
the rights of the individual and the rights of each colony appeared, 
though logically Gistirigaishalle, to rest in some respects on a 
common foundation.
it is important to note that half of the complaints enumerated against 
the King in the Declaration of Iruiependency concern the Empires 
deprivation of colonial governments, the colonies had developed 
political competency almost over night, perhaps even greater competency 
than England herself, Edmund Burke noted this in his speech to Parliment 
calling for reconciliation with the colonies.^  It is rather curious 
that Georgia was considered by Edmund 1 urke to be competent enough to 
govern herself in local affairs in the latter half of the eighteenth 
century, but that the supreme Court rejects this concept 200 years 
later. It points up the incompetence of the Supreme Court. As 1 urke 
put it, "Magnanimity in politics, is not seldom the truest wisdom; and 
a great empire and little minds go ill together.00
In many great empires federalism has occurred naturally-* the Roman 
Empire, the Ottoman Empire,etc.—  because they lacked the technology 
to oversee all aspects of society efficiently. The American Constitution 
of 1787 tried to institutionalise the natural benefits of a federal .
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system, ihe current status of the : Supreme Court has deprived us of the 
benefits of federalism, included among these are the benefits of 
variety. The multifarious nature of our government has bred great 
political progress in the past. Many examples of this were* noted in 
the preface. And Justices Harlan and Frankfurter noted the stagnating 
effect uniformity has on the development of the law and due process.
The most repugnant consequence of this uniform!tyis the 
installation of a stagnant, self-perpetuating bureaucracy. This 
bareacracy Is of course unresponsive to tne desires of the people,
Hichard Neustaut notes in his book, iresidential lower how presidents 
come to power, even with a popular mandate, and have great difficulty
initiating their programs because they meet resistance from a
69bureaucracy with its own agenda. Instead of a citizen-legislature 
providing for local needs, we have a paternalistic army of federal 
agents which set the local agenda, except for those cases where the 
Court has assumed this prerogative, This is the very antithesis of 
sel-government. One of the goals of our government is to inculcate in 
the people the competency to govern themselves, Self-govemence is 
more than the masses going to the polls every two or four years, but 
must include individuals taking societal responsibilities upon themselves, 
Bureacracy discourages this. Federalism provides a format where it can 
be developed, by allowing the States to govern affairs at a state level, 
and by allowing them to constitute themselves in a manner which will 
provide and develop greater autonomy and responsibility at an 
inereasingly-moie-intimate level, Any hope for this is diminished with 
Reynolds v, Sims,
The current relationship between the federal courts and the states 
stifles the democratic process and rapes republican government. The
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Supreme Court has put itself in a position on any local issue, It nas 
demonstrated a propensity for disbanding legislatures and forcing items 
on their agenda. In forcing on the states one man, one vote, it has 
created a situation where a majority interest may dominate a minority 
in the statehouse. Of course the Court has set itself up as the 
defender of minority rights. Though 1 am confident that the Court would 
like to do so, it simply cannot even attempt to protect +hese minorities 
from an unfair allocation of public resources. In the State of Illinois, 
the Chicago arc«. nas a two-to-onu majority. On any issue where the 
suburbs and i \e City have a common interest, they can ram it through the 
political process, over any and all objections from the whole of the 
Downstate. These two regions of the State have a long history of 
competition and animosity .'
This is currently the most tragic aspect of the Court*s activism—  
its inability to resolve complex issues with the competence of the 
political branches of our governments. For example its inability to 
comprehend the complexities of virtual representation. It is true that 
our republican institutions are not perfect, but the Court’s 
imposition of naive formulae has only served to impede their development.
The actions of the Court are often justified because they were 
relieving the impatience of a large segment of the population with 
the slowness of the political process. McGlaughlin tells us that in 
the late 1760s Parliament too was impatient, and "it is the nature 
of fatuous high-handedness to be impatient.While it would be 
inappropriate to label the agrieved parties as high-handed, it is a 
perfect appellation for the Supreme Court. History is littered with 
republics giving way to the institution most willing to satisfy current 
demandt the Homan Republic, the First French Republic, Weimar
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Republic, etc. And in the third world today it is all too common to 
have the military seize power, It just happened in Sudan, and the 
people took to the streets in celebration, I do not wish to pass 
judgement on these governments in their circumstances, but the 
Supreme Court’s pattern is analogous to these usurpations, and these 
are solutions incompatible with the goals of the American tradition of 
constitution. Ours was a Revolution of the people and reconstitution 
by convention and ratification, not by a party, the military, an 
emporer or king, or a group of jurists. The Gourd, has in short usurped 
the sovereign prerogative of the people to constitute their own 
communities.
Summarizing the injury done by the Supreme Court in its
jurisdiction over the states, we may conclude that it has shaken the
very foundations of the Constitution* limited government, federalism,
virtual representation, the right of the people to abolish and reform
their government, and respect for governments long-established. While
the Court has not yet become as oppressive as King George III, any
moderation it still maintains is aggravated by the fact that it,
unlike George, is a usurper of the throne. Furthermore, there are
specific parallels between Jefferson’s litany of complaints against the
crown and the crimes of the Court. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson*
The History of (the Supreme Court of the United States) is a history 
of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object 
the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States, To 
prove this ~*t Facts be submitted to a candid world, (It) has ' 
refused their Meant to Laws, most wholesome and necessary ^or 
public good, ‘ (It), has dissolvedMApresentative Houses. repeatedly, 
»•«, It (haa) obstructed the Administration of Justice, by 
refusing (its) Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary powers,
(The federal government in general) has erected a multitude of 
Mew Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our 
people, and eat out our subetrnce, For talcing away our Charters, 
abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the 
Forms of our Governments* For suspending our own legislatures, and 
declaring themselves Invested with power to legislate for us 
in all cases whatsoever.
VReining in the judiciary has proven to be very difficult. But
checks on the judiciary are not unprecedented. The history of such
events shows us that popular sentiment can rise up and reverse an
unpopular court action. But these measures axe only piecemeal and
address only the unpopularity of the court's action and not the
impropriety of it. The Court has learned to bide its time and wait for
an opportune time to establish long-term precedent on a current popular
whim which corresponds with their own political philosophy. But though *
the Supreme Court has learned quite a bit about avoiding taking a
beating in the political process9 political opinion is once again
72developing am anti-Court sentiment/ This time as the trend foments, 
action should be directed toward the process instead of the product.
What is needed is fundamental change in our political constitution which 
will makd-thetSupteiMr Courts stobjectaio lads and considerate of local 
needs and interests.
At this time there are two different means availiable for adjusting
the Supreme Court's power—  statute and amendment to the Constitution.
Congress has the power to limit the Court's apptll&t* jurisdiction.
The C o u r t s e v e r a l  times admitted the Congress to have 
73this power. But Article III, section 2 does not give to the Congress 
such discretion over the Court's original jurisdiction, which includes 
"all Cases ...in which a State shall be, Party 9. ...M Several proposals, 
tfet&imMfa&l&e Ootdrt' ajurisdifcfcion* wit&ngard to the areas are discussed 
in this paper, have already been made. But any such pspyuzelaa it is 
applied to the states could be circumvented by a Court elaimftg
foriginal Jurisdiction, This s*v.r.ly liaits Of\.ufcha,
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statute. In addition Congress is reluctant to do this for a few very
good reasons. They do not want to rob the people of part of their due
process. They do not want to be politically manipulating litigation.
And if the Court is using current popular opinion to usurp authority,
then Congress is ill-equipped to react. Hence, Congress has only
74once moderately restricted the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
Further there is little hope in the Congress uniting itself for the sake 
of the states.
But let us look at some of these proposals. The thrust of such 1.. 
legislation,is instructive, even-if its feasibility and effectiveness 
are questionable* On October 1, 1962 Senator John Eqst introduced the 
Judicial Reform Act. This proposal focuses mainly on the doctine of 
incorporation,^It would forbid the Court to rule on any case that 
involved an issue or stats due p:.*ocess, OthAfc legislation might 
forbid the Court to hear cases which involve questions o ti  ^ * V,
apportionment.
Another type of legislation which is gaining in popularity is 
that fthiwhioh^Congress tries to redefine the terms of the Constitution. 
One example of this is Senator Jesse Helm's Human Life Statute?, which • 
defines person or citizen in such a way as to include feti, thus making 
abortion murder. Without commenting on the wisdom of this particular V I  
bill,^ we should note tlifci such a measure Would, be .the moethawkward step 
is 1 m e  most twisted and peculiar path of legislation imaginable. I agree 
that the people Ahrotigh-their legislators* should work out such 
coaplexjimecial issues as abortion. The debee and resolution of what are 
essentially issues of how society will take shape should not begin and mi 
end in the Court. But if the legislatise is to have power to rule 
on suohquestions it should not have to preface each one by defining 
the imam.in a separate statute. Let us look at how ludicrous all of
PME '*6
1. ) A state legislature or Congress passes a" law.
2. ) 30year:> later tne Supreme Court discovers a right within the
Bill of Hights (which the framers and everyone else has overlooked for 
150 yearsO and overturns this law and all like it.
3. ) The legislatures and executives of the ration abide by this 
ruling, but Congress passes a law which says that the Court was wrong, 
xhe next move is the Court's. We cannot be sure what they will do,
but the odcis are that they will declare the second law unconstitutional 
also.
Ihe only advantage to such a law is that it forces the issue 
on the Court They are forced to deal with the fact that legislatures do 
have a legitimate 111161*631 in dealing with these issues, If the 
results are not changed, the bench will at least have to reevaluate
r * f
some of their simplistic holdings, such as Roe v. 'Wade/
There is one way in which a reining in of the Court might Lie 
accomplished with legislation. Corn; re so might engage in a general 
assault on its jurisdiction. The Congress could just start stripping 
the Court of all appellate jurisdiction until it became less activist.
And this cculd be done without impairing due process. If it is felt that 
a type of case deserves thgreater consideration through the possibility , 
of more appeals. Congress can just create more courts to handle the 
final appeals. The president and the Senate could conduct the 
appointment process just as vigorously as they do Supreme Court 
selections. I think that providing an alternative judicial authority 
or authorities is the best way to counter the Court*sexcesses,
The best argument against this is that a multiplicity of courts would 
fragment and haze constitutional and legal doctrines. In countering this,
this is i
pack ky
I begin by pointing out that constitutional dor:trine: was meant to be 
developed through the influence of diverse institutions,and interests, 
including legislative, judicial, executive , local an'4 national. And 
there is no risk in losing any foundation of consistency within 
our le^ al system. X think that the multiplicity of lower courts in 
this nation have proven more consistent amongst themselves, than the 
Supreme Court, has alone. We currently have a Court which finds 
employing publicly hired teachers to teach courses in a building 
where religion is also taught an unconstitutional "establishment of 
religion." Jut. it fines the employment of military chaplains 
sufficiently secular in nature. (liote that one is a state employee 
and the other an employee of the federal government.) Unfortunately the 
Congress has no stomach for such aggressive actions.
Amending the Constitution, while it is a more burdensome process 
than passing a bill, is preferable in that it is permanent, and the 
states can influence even dominate the process. A review of the 
amendment process will reveal how a defense of states* rights might 
he erected against judicial usurpation. Amending the Constitution 
is a two-tiered process. First an amendment must be proposed *nd then 
it must be ratified. At each level there are two permissible modes 
of operation.
An amendment may be proposed by a two-thirds vote in ooth of the 
houses of Congress. Ur it may be proposed by a Convention for 
specifically that purpose, called by Congress when petittioned by 
the legislatures of two-thirds of all of the states. The latter method 
is preferable, though not perfect, in that it increases the states1 
role and decreases the federal government's* No amendment has ever 
succeeded in being proposed by this method, muchless ratified later
PACK 40
on. imt a peculiar history explains the non-use of this mode of 
proposition. Congress has the discretion to determine when two-thirds 
of the states have united together to demand a Convention be called. 
Congress has used this discretion to txy to monopolize the proposing 
process, imposing the strictest standards on any attempt to call for 
a convention. 'Hie Congress has used time-elapsed between the first 
and last application to deny the need for a convent* on. it has declared 
that requests for a convention based specific complaints, requests, or 
needs must be based on exactly the same complaint in order to qualify 
together. In fact, the Congress has gone as far as to require that 
a group of applications to qualify as cosignators in a request for a 
convention, they must contain exactly the same language. bow that 
these standards have been established, conforming to them will be 
less difficult, but except for a reasonable-time requirement, none 
of these were intended in Article V of the Constitution. The language 
of Article V clearly intends the initiative to come from the states, and 
for the convention—  not the states—  to propose amendments. This mode 
was designed to measure grass-roots disatisfaction and then respond to 
it with expertise and lively debate at a national level. Congress’ 
role in calling the Convention is a technical necessity, as it is the 
only institution under our Constitution capable of calling such a 
convention.
The purpose of using a convention as opposed to a legislature is 
to avoid the pressures of current political concerns. Just because some 
overzealous state legislatures chose to suggest amendments which the 
convention should propose is no reason for the Congress to dilute and 
qualify their applications* Congress might claim that the states 
themselves placed the qualifications ontheir applications, until it 
demanded that the&e applications be verbally identical* Here we have
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a clear violation of the intent arid language of the Constitution. The 
Supreme Court unsurprisingly has upheld the Congress' use of this power.
We are currently close to achieving the necessary two-thirds
states in calling for an amendment to reqire a balanced federal
budget. Hence impassioned warnings are being sounded about the
perils of a Constitutional Convention. Similar arguments were given in
the early 1960s. At the root of all of them is a lack of confidence in
today’s society to constitute its own government. The eminent Gerald
Gunther of Stanford University expresses some of these fears in an
interview with QUA Today magazine. At first he lauds the concept
as inspiring# but from there he follows a line of reasoning which precludes
any nee of a convention. He claims that the states should debate
all possible amendments runaway convention might propose before they
go on to call for a const!tutional convention. In his mind the states
must be willing to risk complete dissolution of the Constitution over
this particular problem before they should apply for such a convention.
He complains that since the states have not done so, sophisticated
debate of how the Constitution should be amended is beginning much
77too late in the process, I reiterate that the purpose of the elate 
applications is to measure grass-roots discontent. There more 
safeguards against irresponsibility in this mode of proposition than 
in having the Congress propose amendments. Congress will be designing 
the convention. Congress itself might propose all kinds of crazy 
amendments. This mode of proposition allows for checks by Congress, 
the convention, and the states twice. It is very unlikely that 
three-fourths of the state legislatures will push through ratifications 
of an amendment to eliminate the Presidency because of election-year 
fever, as Gunther suggests. Actually our one experience with a
constitutional convention has proven rather successful* and it was , 
runaway conve:.tion.
The two methods of ratifications are the same except that 
in the one amendment is ratified by the state legislatures and in the 
other by state convention. It must be ratified by three-fourths of the 
states. Once again conventions might be called in order to avoid 
a conflict of current political interests. Only once have state 
conventions been used to ratify an amendment—  the Twenty-first* the 
repeal of prohibition. Presumably state legislatures can be trusted 
to seek to increase their own power in the nation. But we might 
want to consider conventions when a issue like Bakei v. Carr is at 
stake* because the legislatures might feel threatened*
There is an inexhaustible source of ideas on how the Constitution 
should be amended. And there a few which have been suggested in the 
past which are of interest to us. Many of these seek to rein in the 
supreme Court or protec^  states* rights or both. We will look at as 
many of these as possible* as we explore a way to try to rectify this 
local-national, legislative-judicial imbalance, On the other hand, we
will ignore George Will's call for an amendment to make English the
75official language of the nation. These suggested amendments cam 
be usefully divided into three categories* 1.) those which seek to 
reverse specific court cases* 2.) those which seek to limit the Court's 
jurisdiction or redirect its focus* 3#) and those which seek radical 
change in the overall structure of our government. The last group arc 
the riskiest* but also have the greatest potential forsuccess*
Those suggested amendments which address a specific case or 
issue include ant-abortion amendments* anti-busing amendments* and 
prmyer-in-school amendments. While such amendments are of great
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interest to those who takc special offense to those court rulings, to 
afford each one an amendment is to clu«, ter up ine Cons glut,j,on and to
miss the pili,? . fcS? proponents of these amendiaenls are not nearly
so concern*Hi W 1 11 1 t’*C uprose Court’s 1sterftre nee in the matter,
as with th ■ fa< l that the Court came down Uli the wrong side of the
issue, ThS' WSi J.U ‘O j.iul as vehemently op nosed to their state and
local go/erumen ts ’LrliililuC.,, f •! od i ! U:gradicn, legal abortion, or
pruhi ei uo : chainst s >iOo.t praye r, imnee their amendments have a
tendency tt St; ?-■ o opcchfic and go too fa1 • .'..oh as trie suggested
amendment which would make ft? t ic i 1 iaens, Having to re/orse every
judicial e>;C0SS With a spec i fie amendment X * > bad government, U-cau; e
it is ..low and awkwarr . C till a few of tbest would be better than
n o 111 If u ,, i. the, mh;ht jar the Court* s s:atu of mind.
.’ho nu-o. o! amendments arc mutIk hiv i-o preferable in that t
go closer to the source of the problem arid w:11 most likely address
the specific grievances anyway. These amendments clarify earlier
statements in the Constitution and should cause the Court to abandon a 
particular doctrine or approach, 01, example of this is a Federalism 
Amendment which has been advocated by Professor Cary L. McDowell of 
Dickenson College. Chile McDowell has not writton the language of this 
would-be amendment, its purpose is to do away with the theory of 
"incorporation.”^  And it would read something like, "Nothing in the
Constitution or i ts Amendments should be read in such a manner as to
apply the fill of Rights to the Ctate or local governments."
80McDowell spells out the advantages of this approach for us*
Thus what lies at the heart of the current problem is the 
deterioration of the principle of federalism as a source of 
restraint on the exercise of judicial power.
Prayer in public schools is only one policy choicej the school 
prayer amendment seeks only to substitute one policy choice for
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another, it does not reach to the level of principle. Like the 
amendments dealing with abortion, busing, criminal justice and 
legislative apportionment, the school prayer amendment seeks 
only to treat symptoms at the expense of curing causes. But 
there is another way.
By.advocating a federalism amendment, a stronger case can be made 
for achieving with one amendment the same results that the 
collection of amendments currently being tossed about are designed 
to secure.
A federalism amendment would seek to nullify the ju . v,tally 
created notion of "incorporation" by clearly stating tnat the 
bill of Rights applies only to the national government....
ouch an amendment would be potent indeed. While it would leave the
Co art room for creative interpretation in other areas, it would strike
at the heart of much of the Court's activism. This federalism
Amendment would affect the Court's meddling in school prayer, abortion,
freedom of the press, affirmative action, and most importantly state
and local due process. While the Court might find imaginative ways to
get at some of these, it would be forced to pause, pay respect to an
unambiguous Constitutional directive, and reorient itself. This would
constitute quite a victory for federalism. Similar amendments might be
passed clarifying national supremacy and the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The final set of woul .-be amendments we will review have a major 
advantage in that there is tiv potential to restructure our legal and 
governmental systems so that they are more balanced. But an amendment 
which alters, creates, or dismantles institutions, as is being suggested, 
would not immediately reverse past excess which have become legal 
precedent. But X am not sure that this is necessary. The results of 
Supreme Court activism are not always perniscious in themselves. And 
a more balanced syotem should have little trouble righting itself 
toward a course of government in line with the wishes and better 
second thoughts of the people.
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in the wake of baker v. Carr and the other early apportionment 
casea, trier war a move to create an alternative judicial authority for 
cases involving issues of federalism. It was labled the Court of the 
Union. It wasbeing promoted alongside two other amendments} one would 
reverse .aker v, Carr and the third would allow the slates to 
amend the Const! tut Ion on their uwn,'J The last of these goes too 
far 1 think, rut the other two aie an example of how two amendments 
might be comDined U completely reverse the trend toward Supreme Court 
domination of the states, i am particularly excited about the proposal 
lor a Court of the Unio . Under that proposal it would consist of all 
of the State Chief Justices, This suggestion war, pretty much laughed 
down when it first became publicized, but the assumptions underlying 
its designation as ludicrous concern its radical and uncertain nature, 
not its merit as a useful institution, I believe this idea can be made 
to work.
It is difficult to address the concerns of those who opposed the 
idea, because they do not enunciate them9 but merely dismiss the 
Court of the Union with belittling epithets, Walter Lippmann calls it 
"patently foolish."^Reporter magazine—  "too silly for even those who 
tend to silliness,”^  But Nation magazine lets the cat out of the bag. 
it calls the idea "simply ridiculous,” but then continues, "one which 
could have mustered interesting arguments in the Federalist period, but
Qa
hardly in this one," In i?&? the people may constitute their own 
government) in 1963 the task must be left to nine "wise" men. It 
176? it is plausible to have a national government of limited , >wers 
and to have local sovereignty protected and respected! in 1963 these 
men favor naionalisation of power and Judicial activism, so there are 
no fintesesil!^ to support coumter-msasures. Speaking of
silly, trice again they try to shroud the real issues in 
modern-versuo-aT'chaic sophistry. It is not the Federalist period they 
oppose, which produced the Constitution they claim to be protecting, 
but Federalism, an idea whose vitality should increase as modernization 
further complicates society and its maintainence.
The real questions which this Court of the Union raises deal 
more with reaching a feasible design for the Court. How do you get 
fifty judges [rom all over the country together at the same time? How do 
you keep this Court from completely replacing the Supreme Court? And 
finally, how do fifty afferent persons come together to produce sound 
legal and constitutional precedent.
ft one of these matters are really difficult, The first two can be 
dealt with in the amendment, and actually answer one another, We keep 
the Court of the Union from getting out of hand by limiting the amount 
of time it can sit to hear cases. Lets say it just sits for one month.
It can hear and decide only a few cases. And any state can rearrange its 
own judicial calendar to let their chief justice go for that month.
Travel in our era will of course not be a problem. In order to produce 
some semblence of precedent, the Court would have to establish greater 
discipline upon itselfi perhaps limiting the number of opinions to 
between two and five.
Another fear is perhaps that this Court constructed as such 
would not have a significant enough influence to be effective.
We must remember that constitutional balance is a subtle and delicate 
thing. If the Court reversed just one major case and its progeny a year, 
it could have wiped out every decision discussed in this paper and dosene 
mors.
Other possible amendments which I have not yet meatisnedi because 
X believe they are misdirected, include eetebUehing popular referenda on
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the retention of federal judges,  ^and repealing the Fourteenth 
Amendment/"0 1 think the best check on judicial excess is an alternative 
judicial authority which can overturn improprieties. Litigation should 
not be subject to popular whim. Repealing the Fourteenth Amendment 
would reopen the door todiscriinination. The Amendment is perhaps 
poorly drafted, it only needs t.o \>e clarified.
i am impressed that there are a number of courses of action that 
might be derived from the above information and successfully implemented. 
Any move in the right direction will put the Supreme Court on its guard.
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ilow is an appropriate time to consider and execute revisions
to our constitution. The Supreme Court continues to accrue more power
and to hammer away at the states. Just this year the Supreme Court
reversed national League of Cities v, Usery, the last weak attempt to
protect some state sovereignty, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, ibis decision allowed the Congress to regulate how
8?the states and municipalities deal with their employees, f
While i personally favor a Court of the Union, I realize that 
any changes which are affected will have to be done within our political 
system and may need to be loss radical. Therefore, I have included 
a whole gamut of alternatives, But the prospects for successfully 
implementing federalist reform are as good now as they have ever been.
The nation is increasingly more dissatisfied with the courts' actions,
A Heritage Coundation survey found that in 1981 77, 3% o f the people 
felt that the federal judiciary did not represent their views, 73*7# 
favored having federal judges undergo periodic reconfiroation and 
68% would support direct election of federal judges,®® Almost every 
segment of the nation has or may have reason to be offended by the 
federal judiciary's activism, 70% of the nation favors prayer in 
public schools. The Courts have recently struck down local affirmative 
action programs, while simultaneously insisting that Chicago wards 
have super-majorities of minorities in order to insure that one of their 
number be elected. Since the courts have recently struck down federal 
campaign-spending reforms, we can be sure that any state efforts along 
those lines will bs shffirt-lived. Those who live in urban areas 
have taken offense to the Court* e hindering criminal prosecution in their 
communities. rural residents have lost moat of thsir political cover.
oplip service to federalism has been elected twice in electoral landslides. 
Most of the fears conjured up by naysayers and sophists are 
hobgoblins. The nation did not reel in despotism when governmental affairs 
were dominated by local Influences. We will not now. Totalitarianism 
can only come from a centralized power, It is true that anarchy 
constitutes tyranny itself and paves the way for despotic government, 
but nothing suggested here comes close to this, A multiplicity of 
sovereigns in this nation has never constituted anarcy,
We as a people have a choice between vigorous self-govern'.ent or 
submitting to a paternalistic bureaucracy and judiciary. We can 
either bravely reconstitute our system of government or Allow the 
federal courts to define the principles we as a society will operate 
under and the bureaucracy spell out the specifics of our lives. The 
prospect of attempting to come one step closer to a Jeffersonian Utopia 
of citizen-legislators in this complex modern era should be exciting.
And for a nation which beat the British of the late 13th century in 
battlei and in its infancy formed a compact whiohhas survived the most 
tumultous 200 years in history9 it should be a cake walk.
We can also take heart in the fact that a president who at leat pays
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